Is it in the "nature" of this new scientific discourse of not obliging to any scientific method, which would be to find a consensus among peers either within the rules of the already existing game or by changing the rules and therefore also the game through a new revelation, but to legitimate its existence and its way of questioning through paralogy. Does he mean with paralogy in this context that this new scientific system is somehow working against its own legitimation or previous forms of scientific legitimation? And how does this interact with narratives. While part of postmodernism is surely the abondenment of metanarratives, he also seems to place actually quite a lot of emphasize on the "little narrative", since he refers to science inventing its own narratives, and also stresses the point that in the humanist system the metanarrative could not be controlled, as they were a product of a discourse among scholars, who also had the possibility to not agree to certain policies.
If the players are to choose their "moves" "locally" how can they avoid terror? Can we maybe construct new narratives, maybe not metanarratives, but still narratives which are important enough to get noticed? And why does he attack Habermas so viciously?
I was also a lot reminded of Foucault and how he traces the historical development of how our times method to determine truth resulted in the model of the "epreuve". And also of his concept of power/knowledge.
definitely an exciting text,
a wondering social atom
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